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Comment
DOJ BLOWS THE WHISTLE ON PROFESSIONAL
WHISTLEBLOWERS: BUT THE CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT ON
WHETHER DISMISSALS WILL BE SWIFT
JENNIFER HARCHUT*
“Referees are the law.  They are law in action.  They have a whistle.  They
blow it.  And that whistle is the articulation of God’s justice.”1
I. WHEN THE DOJ BLOWS THE WHISTLE, WILL ITS CALL BE SUBJECT TO
FURTHER REVIEW?: INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) began to
more aggressively assert itself as the ultimate referee for articulating justice
in cases brought by whistleblowers under the federal False Claims Act
(FCA).2  This development has drastic implications for the enforcement of
the FCA, pursuant to which the DOJ recovered over $2.8 billion in 2018
alone and over $59 billion since 1986 when Congress significantly
strengthened the FCA.3  At stake is whether the Executive Branch can ex-
ercise its historical prerogative to decide which cases to take forward in the
name of the United States, or whether whistleblowers, who may not always
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A. 2018, Columbia University.  This Comment is dedicated to my parents,
Helene and Bob, my sisters Kristen, Lisa, Kelly, and Nicole, and my amazing
grandmother, Peggy Koller, all of whom have provided me with never-ending love
and support.  I would also like to thank the dedicated members of the Villanova
Law Review for their tremendous assistance throughout the writing and editing of
this Comment, particularly Mackenzie Brennan, Brett Broczkowski, Chelsea Eret,
Gregory Ferroni, Taylor Miller, Margaret Oberkircher, Mallory Phillips, Madison
Slupe, and Matthew Venuti.
1. HAROLD PINTER, MOONLIGHT 68 (Grove Press ed., 1994).
2. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2018).  For a discussion of
the recent cases in which the DOJ has more aggressively asserted its authority to
dismiss FCA actions, see infra Section II.F.
3. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Dep’t Recovers over $2.8 Billion
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018 (Dec. 21, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-28-billion-false-claims-
act-cases-fiscal-year-2018 [https://perma.cc/ZQL9-Q2W3] (“Of the $2.8 billion in
settlements and judgments recovered by the Department of Justice this past fiscal
year, $2.5 billion involved the health care industry, including drug and medical
device manufacturers, managed care providers, hospitals, pharmacies, hospice or-
ganizations, laboratories, and physicians.”).
(419)
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act in the public’s best interest, can convince the Judicial Branch to sec-
ond-guess the DOJ’s decisions to dismiss.4
The FCA imposes penalties for the submission of false claims to the
United States government and allows private parties, called relators (i.e.,
whistleblowers), to sue for violations of the FCA on behalf of the govern-
ment.5  In an FCA case filed by a relator—known as a qui tam action—the
government can choose to take over the litigation by intervening.6  If the
government declines to intervene in the case, the relator can proceed with
the action on behalf of the United States.7  Nonetheless, under section
3730(c)(2)(A) of the FCA, the government has statutory authority to dis-
miss the qui tam action, even if the relator objects.8
There remains a long-standing federal circuit split with regard to the
standard governing DOJ requests to dismiss FCA cases.9  The courts are
4. For a critical analysis of the constitutional concerns raised by the Judicial
Branch potentially usurping the Executive Branch’s authority, see infra Section
IV.A.
5. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2018) (granting authority to private persons to
bring civil actions for false claims “in the name of the Government”).
6. See id. § 3730(b)(2) (granting the government authority to take over the
case and explaining that the complaint remains under seal for at least sixty days
while the government considers whether to intervene).
7. See id. § 3730(c)(3) (providing that the government, upon its request,
“shall be served with copies of all pleadings filed in the action and shall be sup-
plied with copies of all deposition transcripts (at the Government’s expense)”); see
also Memorandum from Michael Granston, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dir. Commercial
Litig. Branch, Fraud Section, to Attorneys, Commercial Litig. Branch, Fraud Sec-
tion & Assistant U.S. Attorneys Handling False Claims Act Cases, Offices of the U.S.
Attorneys, Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), at 8 n.5
(Jan. 10, 2018), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4358602/Memo-
for-Evaluating-Dismissal-Pursuant-to-31-U-S.pdf [https://perma.cc/NH8Q-WN8C]
[hereinafter Granston Memo] (noting that since January 1, 2012, qui tam relators
have voluntarily dismissed more than 700 cases after the government declined to
intervene).  “The frequency with which relators voluntarily dismiss declined qui
tam actions has significantly reduced the number of cases where the government
might otherwise have considered seeking dismissal pursuant to section
3730(c)(2)(A).” Id.; see also Michael Volkov, False Claims Act 2018 Year in Review –
Making Sense of the DOJ Fraud Statistics, JDSUPRA (Jan. 21, 2019), https://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/false-claims-act-2018-year-in-review-62368/ [https://
perma.cc/2GVQ-AKJK] (“In 2018, recoveries from qui tam actions in which the
government declined intervention constituted only 4% of total recoveries, which is
more consistent with prior years.”); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, FIXING
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: THE CASE FOR COMPLIANCE-FOCUSED REFORMS 7 (2013),
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Fix-
ing_The_FCA_Pages_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YML-F8BS] (explaining that
“DOJ intervention is almost always an accurate predictor of the ultimate success of
the case”).
8. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2018) (providing that the government may
dismiss the qui tam case if the government has notified the relator of the filing of
its motion to dismiss and “the court has provided the [relator] with an opportunity
for a hearing on the motion”).
9. See Health Choice All., LLC ex rel. United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 5:17-
CV-123-RWS-CMC, 2019 WL 2520165, at *4–10 (E.D. Tex. May 16, 2019), opinion
amended and superseded by No. 5:17-CV-123-RWS-CMC, 2019 WL 5691988 (E.D. Tex.
2
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divided over whether the statute gives the government an “unfettered
right” to unilaterally dismiss qui tam actions, as the D.C. Circuit found in
Swift v. United States,10 or whether the DOJ must show that dismissal serves
a valid government purpose, as the Ninth Circuit required in United States
ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp.11  In the fifteen years
following the emergence of the circuit split in 2003, the issue of which
standard to apply received little attention because, until recently, the DOJ
rarely used its authority to dismiss a qui tam case if the relator objected.12
In 2018, however, the issue took on much greater significance when
Michael Granston, Director of the DOJ’s Commercial Litigation Branch,
Fraud Section, issued a memorandum (the Granston Memo) suggesting
that, when deciding whether to decline intervention in qui tam cases, DOJ
attorneys should also evaluate whether to seek dismissal.13  In his memo,
Granston pointed out that “[o]ver the last several years, the Department
has seen record increases in qui tam actions.”14  In order to reduce the
burdens imposed on the government by so many new cases and to guard
against adverse decisions that could hinder the DOJ’s ability to enforce the
FCA, Granston encouraged DOJ attorneys to consider whether the govern-
ment’s interests would be better served by seeking dismissal of FCA cases
over relators’ objections, when appropriate.15
June 20, 2019), report and recommendation adopted as modified, No. 5:17-CV-123-RWS-
CMC, 2019 WL 4727422 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2019) (detailing the split between the
circuits that began in 2003 when the D.C. Circuit rejected the approach of the
Ninth Circuit), appeal docketed, No. 19-40906 (5th Cir. Oct. 29, 2019).
10. 318 F.3d 250, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding an unfettered right of govern-
ment to unilaterally dismiss qui tam actions based on statutory interpretation,
prior precedent, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
11. 151 F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998) (adopting a two-step rational relation
standard).  For a discussion of the different approaches articulated by Sequoia and
Swift, see infra Sections II.D–E.
12. See Stephen Cox, Deputy Assoc. Attorney General, Remarks at the 2019
Advanced Forum on False Claims and Qui Tam Enforcement (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-associate-attorney-general-stephen-
cox-delivers-remarks-2019-advanced-forum-false [https://perma.cc/DSM3-MGSW]
(noting that in the past the DOJ used its dismissal authority “sparingly”).
13. See Granston Memo, supra note 7, at 3–7 (setting forth seven non-exhaus-
tive factors that the DOJ should consider as bases for dismissal); see also Douglas
Baruch, John Boese & Jennifer Wollenberg, How FCA Circuit Split Is Playing out in
District Court, LAW360 (Apr. 12, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1149626/how-fca-circuit-split-is-playing-out-in-district-court [https://perma.cc/
26A9-VYT7] (stating that, following the Granston Memo, the DOJ “now appears to
be flexing its dismissal authority muscle . . . [which] has caused more lower courts
to assess the standards”).
14. Granston Memo, supra note 7, at 1 (noting that annual totals of qui tam
cases were “approaching or exceeding 600 new matters”).
15. Id. at 1 (“Even in non-intervened cases, the government expends signifi-
cant resources in monitoring these cases and sometimes must produce discovery
or otherwise participate.  If the cases lack substantial merit, they can generate ad-
verse decisions that affect the government’s ability to enforce the FCA.”).  For a
discussion of when the DOJ would consider dismissal to be appropriate, see infra
note 107.
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Spurred on by Granston’s encouragement, the DOJ significantly in-
creased its filings of motions to dismiss qui tam actions in 2018 and
2019.16  Several recent district court decisions, which have reached diver-
gent results, demonstrate that the post-Granston Memo dismissals are
magnifying the long-standing split and will soon force federal circuit
courts or the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify the controlling standard.17  In
numerous cases that the DOJ recently moved to dismiss, billions of dollars
were at stake as healthcare company defendants faced off against “profes-
sional relators” represented by some of the most prominent attorneys in
the United States.18  If professional relators can persuade courts to sec-
ond-guess DOJ decisions to dismiss by requiring the DOJ to prove that a
16. See Lydia Wheeler, Government Tosses out More Whistleblower Cases After 2018
Memo, BLOOMBERG L. (June 24, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-
law-and-business/government-tosses-out-more-whistleblower-cases-after-2018-
memo [https://perma.cc/G48K-Y636] (reporting that, since the issuance of the
Granston Memo on January 10, 2018, “the DOJ has moved to dismiss a larger num-
ber of cases than in the past” with at least thirty cases dismissed since the Granston
guidance was adopted (internal quotation marks omitted)).
17. See Jason Crawford, John Brennan & Keith Harrison, Limits of DOJ’s Qui
Tam Dismissal Authority Are Unsettled, LAW360 (July 2, 2019, 2:04 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/1174816/limits-of-doj-s-qui-tam-dismissal-authority-are-
unsettled [https://perma.cc/5WC3-QG3H] (explaining that district court deci-
sions on the applicable standard of review for government motions to dismiss “con-
tinue to percolate up through the courts of appeals, [and] the Supreme Court may
eventually need to weigh in on the contours of the government’s dismissal author-
ity”).  For a discussion of the district court decisions, see infra notes 101–103 and
accompanying text.
18. See P. David Yates, DOJ: A Company Created to File Lawsuits Has Wasted 1,500
Hours of the Government’s Time, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2018, 6:02 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/12/19/doj-a-company-created-to-file-
lawsuits-has-wasted-1500-hours-of-the-governments-time/ [https://perma.cc/
X7DP-VYXJ] (discussing prominent lawyers representing professional relators—
i.e., limited liability companies that were created to file FCA qui tam claims);
Health Choice All., LLC ex rel. United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 5:17-CV-123-
RWS-CMC, 2019 WL 2520165 (E.D. Tex. May 16, 2019), report and recommendation
adopted as modified, No. 5:17-CV-00123-RWS-CMC, 2019 WL 4727422 (E.D. Tex.
Sept. 27, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-40906 (5th Cir. Oct. 29, 2019) (qui tam case
filed against pharmaceutical companies by prominent attorneys representing lim-
ited liability company).  Health Choice Group, LLC, is a limited liability company
established by National Health Care Analysis Group (NHCA), which is “a pseudo-
nym for a partnership comprised of limited liability companies set up by investors
and former Wall Street investment bankers.” See United States’ Motion to Dismiss
Relator’s Second Amended Complaint at 2, United States ex rel. Health Choice
Group, LLC v. Bayer Corp., No. 5:17-CV-126-RWS-CMC (E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2018).
In addition to the Bayer and Eli Lilly cases, NHCA also filed eleven complaints
against a total of thirty-eight different defendants. See id. (listing ten complaints
filed by NHCA entities); see also Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of United
States’ Motion to Dismiss Relator’s First Amended Complaint at 1 n.1, United
States ex rel. NHCA-TEX, LLC v. TEVA Pharma. Prods. Ltd., No. 17-2040 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 18, 2019) (citing an additional complaint filed by NHCA).  For a discussion of
the recent cases filed by professional relator NHCA, see infra notes 123–124 and
accompanying text.
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dismissal serves a valid government purpose, then serious constitutional
and public policy issues will be at stake.19
This Comment advocates for courts to follow the approach taken by
the D.C. Circuit in Swift, which provides the DOJ an “unfettered right” to
dismiss FCA actions, because (1) in order to uphold the constitutionality
of the FCA’s qui tam provisions, courts must not interfere with the Execu-
tive Branch’s “historical prerogative to decide which cases should go for-
ward in the name of the United States”20 and (2) for public policy reasons,
the DOJ should be allowed to exercise its discretion to dismiss FCA claims
in order to rein in overreach by professional relators.21  Part II of this
Comment reviews the relevant history of qui tam enforcement and the
FCA, explains how the FCA works today, details the split between courts
following the standards set forth in the Sequoia and Swift decisions, and
explores the effects of the Granston Memo.  Part III discusses the recent
wave of cases that exacerbated the split between the circuits, pointing out
that many of these cases have been brought by professional relators
backed by investors and former Wall Street investment bankers.  Part IV
analyzes the problems with the Sequoia standard and advocates for courts
to adopt the Swift standard instead in order to uphold the constitutionality
of the FCA and further public policy interests.  Finally, Part V discusses the
adverse impact that will result if courts do not follow the Swift standard for
DOJ dismissals.
II. THE RULES, THE PARTICIPANTS, AND PRIOR GAMES: BACKGROUND ON
QUI TAM ENFORCEMENT
The history of qui tam enforcement in England and of the FCA in the
United States provides valuable lessons for understanding how qui tam
litigation has evolved to become so significant today.22  After discussing
that history and explaining how the current FCA statute works, this Part
then examines the circuit court split regarding what standard courts
should apply when reviewing DOJ motions to dismiss.23  That split has
taken on much greater importance since 2018 when the DOJ began dis-
missing more and more qui tam cases in the wake of the Granston
Memo.24
19. For a discussion of the constitutional and public policy issues at stake, see
infra Section IV.
20. Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  For a discussion
of the constitutional issue, see infra Section IV.A.
21. For a discussion of why the DOJ should be allowed to exercise its discre-
tion to rein in overreach by professional relators, see infra Section IV.B.
22. For a discussion of the relevant history of qui tam enforcement in Eng-
land and of the FCA in the United States, see infra Sections II.A–B.
23. For an explanation of how the FCA works today, see infra Section II.C.
For a discussion of the circuit court split concerning the standard of review for
DOJ dismissals, see infra Sections II.D–E.
24. For a discussion of the effects of the Granston Memo, see infra Section
II.F.
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A. Players Helping the Referees: A Brief History of Qui Tam Enforcement
in England
Qui tam enforcement originated in English law around the end of the
thirteenth century.25  Qui tam actions allowed private individuals to bring
suits “in the royal courts on both their own and the Crown’s behalf.”26
Initially, English courts allowed for qui tam actions through common law,
but later included the right in statutory provisions.27  “One type of statute,
appropriately named informer statutes, allowed informers to obtain a por-
tion of the penalty dealt as a reward for [providing] their information,
even if they themselves suffered no injury.”28  Eventually, on account of
rampant abuse of the statutes by predatory and professional relators, in-
former statutes as a basis for qui tam actions generated significant opposi-
tion.29  Members of the English Parliament were disturbed by the
pernicious effects of qui tam enforcement, “including extortion of secret
settlements, fraudulent accusations, and unrestrained pursuit of defend-
ants for minor offenses.”30  Consequently, in 1951, Parliament passed the
Common Informers Act and abolished qui tam actions in England
entirely.31
25. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
774 (2000) (explaining the origination, form, and purpose of qui tam actions in
England).  The Latin phrase qui tam is an abbreviation for “qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means ‘who pursues this action on our
Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.’” Id. at 768 n.1 (quoting 3 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *160).
26. Id. at 774 (citing Prior of Lewes v. De Holt (1300), reprinted in 48 SELDEN
SOCIETY 198 (1931)).
27. See id. at 774–75 (providing a history of qui tam actions).
28. Laura Leigh Fox, Note, Getting Schooled: The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit Holds That the Federal Government Need Not Show “Good Cause”
Before Settling and Dismissing a Pending Qui Tam Action Against College, 69 MERCER L.
REV. 1285, 1292 (2018) (citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 775).
29. See id. (citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 775; Jonathan T. Brollier,
Mutiny of the Bounty: A Moderate Change in the Incentive Structure of Qui Tam Actions
Brought Under the False Claims Act, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 693, 998 (2006)) (providing a
detailed history of qui tam actions); see also J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and
the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 553–608 (2000)
(explaining the history of qui tam actions in England and the United States).  Beck
argued that the “conflict of interests” inherent in qui tam statutes that led to their
abolition in England is also present in the FCA. Id. at 608–09, 642.
30. William Y. Culbertson, Whistleblowers and Prosecutors Achieving the Best Inter-
ests of the Public, BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 2008, at 32 (providing a brief history of
qui tam enforcement).
31. See Beck, supra note 29, at 603–08 (describing English Parliament mem-
bers’ dislike for informers and the debate over the abolition bill).  Specifically,
Beck details the language used by members of Parliament when discussing the bill:
“Members of Parliament described the informer as an ‘unnatural creature of stat-
ute,’ ‘a parasite who is legally empowered to sue for money for which he has not
worked,’ a ‘frightful beast,’ a ‘malodorous type.’” Id. at 606 (quoting 483 Parl.
Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) (1951) 2079, 2106, 2097, 2110, 2112)).
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B. The Playing Field Then and Now: A Brief History of the FCA
in the United States
While qui tam enforcement was never as widespread in the United
States as it once was in England, “[e]arly American Congresses continued
the English practice by enacting a few qui tam statutes.”32  Although a few
qui tam provisions have survived to this day, “only the False Claims Act has
generated a large number of federal qui tam cases.”33  Congress enacted
the FCA—sometimes referred to as Lincoln’s Law—during the Civil War
in 1863 to prevent private contractors from defrauding the Union Army
through practices such as selling sawdust instead of gunpowder.34  To
counter such fraudulent activities, the FCA prohibits the submission of
false claims to the government and allows private individuals—also known
as relators—to bring qui tam actions to enforce the law.35
The FCA qui tam provisions were rarely used until World War II,
when relators began abusing the statute after “someone discovered a loop-
hole that allowed an individual to bring a qui tam action based on informa-
tion the government already had and was actively prosecuting.”36  With
the emerging prominence of these “parasitic” cases, Congress amended
32. Id. at 553–55 (providing examples of other qui tam provisions in the U.S.
Code).  One such example being that “[a] qui tam action . . . may be filed when a
person falsely marks an item to suggest patent protection or to imply consent of a
patentee.” Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 292 (1994)).
33. Id. at 555 (distinguishing the FCA from less frequently used qui tam stat-
utes in the U.S. Code).  Between the passage of the 1986 FCA amendments and
September 1999, 2,959 qui tam actions were filed. See id. at 542.
34. See Stephen Cox, Deputy Assoc. Attorney Gen., Remarks to the Cleveland,
Tennessee Rotary Club 3 (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
deputy-associate-attorney-general-stephen-cox-gives-remarks-cleveland-tennessee-
rotary [https://perma.cc/6YMD-MPDV] (describing the history of the FCA and
the important role it plays in fighting fraud on the taxpayer); see also Vt. Agency of
Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 781 (stating that “the FCA was enacted in 1863 with the prin-
cipal goal of ‘stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by large [private] contrac-
tors during the Civil War’” (quoting United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309
(1976))); Evan J. Ballan, Note, Protecting Whistleblowing (and Not Just Whistleblowers),
116 MICH. L. REV. 475, 479–80 (2017) (explaining Michigan Senator Jacob How-
ard’s characterization of the qui tam legislation when he first introduced the bill:
“[I]ts effect was to ‘hold out to a confederate a strong temptation to betray his
coconspirator’ based upon the ‘old-fashioned idea of . . . ‘“setting a rouge to catch
a rouge,’” which is the safest and most expeditious way I have ever discovered of
bringing rogues to justice.” (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952
(1863) (statement of Sen. Howard))).
35. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2018); see also Sharon Finegan, The False
Claims Act and Corporate Criminal Liability: Qui Tam Actions, Corporate Integrity Agree-
ments and the Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 625, 641 (2007)
(detailing the history of the FCA).
36. Culbertson, supra note 30, at 32 (describing the loophole in the FCA and
explaining that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,
317 U.S. 537 (1943), which affirmed the lower court decision that an informer
could sue under the FCA based on information in public criminal indictments, led
to Congress amending the statute to prohibit such qui tam actions); see also Fine-
gan, supra note 35 (explaining that, in the 1940s, relators realized the profitability
7
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the FCA in 1943 to prevent such suits by prohibiting qui tam actions
brought on the basis of publicly available information.37  Additionally, the
amended FCA reduced the potential reward that relators could receive
and allowed the government to choose to intervene and take over qui tam
suits.38
The 1943 amendments produced a chilling effect on qui tam litiga-
tion that would last for the next forty years.39  In 1986, however, Congress
again amended the FCA to strengthen qui tam enforcement incentives
because of a “growing . . . concern about defense-procurement fraud.”40
The 1986 amendments enhanced the rewards for relators by increasing
penalties on defendants and by raising the relators’ percentage share in
the ultimate settlement or judgment.41  In addition, the amendments sig-
nificantly increased the government’s control over qui tam actions.42
Since the 1986 amendments, qui tam filings have increased dramati-
cally and now account for a large percentage of all FCA cases.43  More-
of qui tam suits and, as nothing in the FCA prohibited it, brought cases based on
information publicly available in criminal indictments).
37. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2018) (“No court shall have jurisdiction
over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations
or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional,
administrative or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit or investi-
gation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney Gen-
eral or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.”);
see also Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381,
389–90 (2001) (stating that the 1943 amendments “all but eliminated the use of
the FCA qui tam”); Gregory G. Brooker, The False Claims Act: Congress Giveth and the
Courts Taketh Away, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 373, 378 (2002) (explaining that “Congress
came close . . . to barring all qui tam actions under the FCA”); Finegan, supra note
35, at 642 (“Following these amendments, fewer actions were brought under the
FCA and its qui tam provisions were used infrequently until 1986.”).
38. See 31 U.S.C. § 3491(E)(1)–(2) (2018); see also Brooker, supra note 37, at
378 (explaining that after the 1943 amendments, relators were “no longer guaran-
teed half of the award in qui tam suits,” but instead “could receive only ‘fair and
reasonable compensation’ if the government chose to intervene . . . and prosecute
it itself”).
39. See Ni Qian, Note, Necessary Evils: How to Stop Worrying and Love Qui Tam,
2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 594, 606 (2013) (“The 1943 amendment achieved its
intended purpose and chilled qui tam actions for the next four decades . . . .”).
40. David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui
Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913, 1943 (2014) (describing the modern ver-
sion of the FCA that emerged because of “public concern about defense-procure-
ment fraud”); see also Qian, supra note 39, at 606–07 (explaining that when the
media reported that the government was purchasing “$435 hammers and $7,622
coffee pots . . . Congress was pressured to crack down on false claims and to amend
the FCA”).
41. See Qian, supra note 39, at 607–08 (detailing increased penalties and
rewards).
42. For a discussion of how the 1986 amendments increased the govern-
ment’s control over qui tam cases, see infra note 65 and accompanying text.
43. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3 (reporting that
“whistleblower, or qui tam, actions comprise a significant percentage of the False
Claims Act cases that are filed”).  “The number of lawsuits filed under the qui tam
8
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over, following the 1986 amendments, $42 billion of the $59 billion
recovered under the FCA resulted from qui tam actions filed by
whistleblowers.44  In 2018 alone, relators filed 645 qui tam actions and the
DOJ “recovered over $2.1 billion in these and earlier filed suits.”45
C. Playing by the Rules: How the FCA Works
Under 31 U.S.C. § 3730, an FCA action may be commenced by either:
(1) the government itself bringing a civil action46 or (2) a relator bringing
a qui tam action.47  If a relator initiates the FCA case, the complaint is not
immediately served on the defendant.48  Instead, the relator’s complaint is
under seal for at least sixty days, which allows the government to investi-
gate the claim and determine whether to intervene.49  If the government
intervenes, the relator can receive 15%–25% of the proceeds of the litiga-
tion or settlement.50  If the government declines to intervene, the relator
may proceed with the prosecution on behalf of the United States and re-
provisions of the Act has grown significantly since 1986, with 645 qui tam suits filed
this past year—an average of more than 12 new cases every week.” Id. (discussing
the increase in qui tam lawsuits).
44. See Cox, supra note 34, at 1 (reporting the amount of money recovered by
the government from FCA cases filed by relators since 1986).
45. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3 (discussing the increase in qui
tam lawsuits filed after the 1986 FCA amendments).
46. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2018) (“The Attorney General diligently shall in-
vestigate a violation under [the FCA].  If the Attorney General finds that a person
has violated or is violating [the FCA], the Attorney General may bring a civil action
under this section against the person.”).
47. See id. § 3730(b)(1) (“A person may bring a civil action for a violation of
[the FCA] for the person and for the United States Government.  The action shall
be brought in the name of the Government.”).
48. See id. § 3730(b)(2) (“A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of
substantially all material evidence and information the person possesses shall be
served on the Government pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  The complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at
least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders.
The Government may elect to intervene and proceed with the action within 60
days after it receives both the complaint and the material evidence and
information.”).
49. See id. (explaining the steps that must occur before the defendant can be
served with a complaint).  Determining whether to intervene means deciding
whether the government will “proceed with the action, in which case the action
shall be conducted by the Government; or . . . decline[] to take over the action, in
which case the person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the ac-
tion.” Id. § 3730(b)(4)(A)–(B).
50. See id. § 3730(d)(1) (providing that the percentage the relator receives
“depend[s] upon the extent to which the [relator] substantially contributed to the
prosecution of the action”). See generally Cox, supra note 34 (“The Department
takes over—or ‘intervenes’ in—about 20% of the cases that are filed.”).
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ceive 25%–30% of any award.51  Nevertheless, even when the government
declines to intervene, the DOJ retains significant rights in the litigation.52
Notably, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A), the DOJ has the
right to dismiss a qui tam case even if the relator objects, as long as the
government notifies the relator of the filing of its motion to dismiss and
the court provides the relator with an opportunity for a hearing on the
motion.53  Unfortunately, the FCA does not provide a standard of review
for evaluating government dismissals.54  In the absence of specific statu-
tory guidance, courts have adopted two different standards for review.55
The Ninth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit, along with numerous district
51. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)(2), (b)(4)(B) (2018) (stating that, if the govern-
ment declines to intervene, then the relator may proceed with the action); Id.
§ 3730(d)(2) (stating the percentage amount the relator shall receive if the action
is settled or a judgment is returned against the defendant).  Under both sections
3730(d)(1) and 3730(d)(2), the relator can also “receive an amount for reason-
able expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reason-
able attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. §§ 3730(d)(1), (d)(2) (describing possible
awards for qui tam plaintiffs).
52. See United States ex rel. Panzey Belgium Harris v. EMD Serono, Inc., 370 F.
Supp. 3d 483, 487 (2019) (summarizing some of the rights retained by the govern-
ment when it declines to intervene).  For example, even if the government de-
clines to intervene, “[t]he relator cannot dismiss the action without the written
consent of the Attorney General.” Id. at 487; see also Granston Memo, supra note 7,
at 3 n.2 (noting that 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) “is just one of several mechanisms
contained in the FCA to ensure that the United States retains substantial control
over lawsuits brought on its behalf”). See generally Transcript of Oral Argument at
48, Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1986
(2016) (No. 15-7), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argu-
ment_transcripts/2015/15-7_6537.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EGH-WF5H] (provid-
ing statement of Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm Steward noting various reasons
why the DOJ might decline to intervene: “[W]e don’t typically give public explana-
tions of why we don’t intervene.  Sometimes it’s because the dollar amount is
small.  Sometimes it’s because . . . we think that the relator is capable of handling
the case himself, or the relator’s counsel.  Sometimes . . . [it’s] because we’re skep-
tical of the merits of a case.  But even in those situations, it could be that we agree
with the relator’s theory and simply don’t know whether the facts could be
proved.”)
53. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2018) (“The Government may dismiss the
action notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action if the per-
son has been notified by the Government of the filing of the motion and the court
has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.”).
54. See Granston Memo, supra note 7, at 3 (explaining that the FCA does not
specify either a standard of review to be used by courts or provide “specific
grounds for dismissal”).
55. Compare United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing
Corp., 151 F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the United States must
identify a “valid government purpose” that is rationally related to dismissal), with
Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the United
States has an “unfettered right” to dismiss qui tam actions).  There are also cases
that declined to adopt either Swift or Sequoia but that found dismissal appropriate
under either standard. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. Raytheon Co., 395
F. Supp. 3d 791 (N.D. Tex. 2019); United States ex rel. Borzilleri v. AbbVie, Inc., 15-
CV-7881 (JMF), 2019 WL 3203000 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2019); United States ex rel.
Nicholson v. Spigelman, No. 10 C 3361, 2011 WL 2683161 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2011).
10
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courts, have adopted a rational relation test.56  On the other hand, the
D.C. Circuit and several district courts have held that the DOJ has an “un-
fettered right” to dismiss qui tam actions.57
D. DOJ Whistles Do Not Necessarily Stop the Game: The Ninth and Tenth
Circuits’ Rational Relation Test
In 1998, the Ninth Circuit became the first circuit court to announce
a standard of review for government dismissals of qui tam cases.58  In Se-
quoia, an orange processor and an orange grower brought qui tam actions
against other citrus companies for allegedly violating “the orange and
lemon marketing orders promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture.”59
“The government intervened several years [into] the litigation . . . and
sought dismissal under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)” after the Secretary of
56. See Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2005) (adopt-
ing the Sequoia rational relation approach); Sequoia, 151 F.3d at 1145 (applying
rational relation test).  A number of district court cases recently applied the Sequoia
standard. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 3:11-cv-
00941-EMC, 2019 WL 5722618 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2019) (granting the govern-
ment’s motion to dismiss in a district court within the Ninth Circuit); EMD Serono,
370 F. Supp. at 498–91 (granting the DOJ’s motion to dismiss in a district court
within the Third Circuit); United States ex rel. CIMZNHCA v. UCB, Inc., No. 17-
CV-765-SMY-MAB, 2019 WL 1598109, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2019), appeal docketed,
No. 19-2273 (7th Cir. July 8, 2019) (denying the DOJ’s motion to dismiss in a
district court within the Seventh Circuit); United States ex rel. Toomer v. Ter-
raPower, LLC, No. 4:16-cv-00226-DCN, 2018 WL 4934070, at *8 (D. Idaho Oct. 10,
2018) (granting the DOJ’s motion to dismiss in a district court within the Ninth
Circuit); United States ex rel. Thrower v. Acad. Mortg. Corp., No. 16-cv-02120-EMC,
2018 WL 3208157, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16408
(9th Cir. July 27, 2018) (denying the government’s motion to dismiss in a district
court within the Ninth Circuit).
57. See Swift, 318 F.3d at 252 (holding that “[n]othing in [31 U.S.C.]
§ 3730(c)(2)(A) purports to deprive the Executive Branch of its historical preroga-
tive to decide which cases should go forward in the name of the United States”).
Many courts have adopted the Swift standard. See, e.g.,  Health Choice All., LLC ex
rel. United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 5:17-CV-123-RWS-CMC, 2019 WL 2520165
(E.D. Tex. May 16, 2019), report and recommendation adopted as modified, No. 5:17-CV-
00123-RWS-CMC, 2019 WL 4727422, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2019), appeal dock-
eted, No. 19-40906 (5th Cir. Oct. 29, 2019) (granting the DOJ’s motion to dismiss
in a district court within the Fifth Circuit); United States ex rel. De Sessa v. Dallas
Cty. Hosp. Dist., No. 3:17-CV-1782-K, 2019 WL 2225072 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2019)
(same); United States ex rel. Sibley v. Delta Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. 4:17-cv-000053-
GHD-RP, 2019 WL 1305069 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 21, 2019) (same); United States ex rel.
Davis v. Hennepin County, No. 18-cv-01551 (ECT/HB), 2019 WL 608848 (D.
Minn. Feb. 13, 2019) (granting the DOJ’s motion to dismiss in a district court
within the Eighth Circuit); United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Ball Homes, LLC,
No. 5: 17-379-DCR, 2018 WL 3213614 (E.D. Ky. June 29, 2018) (granting the DOJ’s
motion to dismiss in a district court within the Sixth Circuit); United States ex rel.
Levine v. Avnet, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-17 (WOB-CJS), 2015 WL 1499519 (E.D. Ky. Apr.
1, 2015) (same).
58. See Eli Lilly, 2019 WL 2520165, at *4 (“In 1998, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals first considered the issue.” (citing Sequoia, 151 F.3d 1139)).
59. See Sequoia, 151 F.3d at 1141.
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Agriculture decided to abandon the marketing program.60  The district
court granted the government’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
government’s reasons for dismissal were rationally related to legitimate
government purposes and dismissal was not arbitrary or capricious.61  On
appeal, the relators argued “that the district court erred by interpreting 31
U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) to allow the government to dismiss a meritorious
qui tam action,” and that such an interpretation “is inconsistent with the
general framework of the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 which
was intended to provide relators with ‘increased involvement in suits
brought by the relator but litigated by the Government.’”62
The Ninth Circuit in Sequoia began its discussion by pointing out that
the FCA does not set forth the circumstances under which the government
can dismiss a qui tam action.63  The court noted, however, that the Ninth
Circuit has previously likened the government’s ability to dismiss to the
government’s ability to exercise prosecutorial discretion.64  Responding to
the relator’s argument that the legislative history of the 1986 amendments
does not support allowing the government to dismiss meritorious qui tam
cases, the court explained that while the 1986 amendments did increase
the relator’s role in FCA cases, the government continued to possess “ ‘pri-
mary responsibility’ for the case and now enjoys supervisory powers over
the relator.”65  Citing the legislative history of the 1986 amendments, the
60. See id.
61. See id. (citing United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing
House Co., 912 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Cal. 1995)).
62. Id. at 1143–44 (citation omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 13
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5278).
63. See id.
64. Id. at 1145 (citing United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 756
(9th Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715,
724 (9th Cir. 1994)) (recognizing that the FCA does not curtail the government’s
ability to exercise its prosecutorial discretion).
65. Sequoia, 151 F.3d at 1144 (explaining the government’s supervisory pow-
ers in qui tam cases).
The government can limit the relator’s participation by restricting the
number of the relator’s witnesses or the length of their testimony. See 31
U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(C).  The government may also stay the relator’s dis-
covery requests if they are likely to interfere with the government’s crimi-
nal or civil investigation of related matters. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(4).
The amended statute allows the government to settle an action, notwith-
standing the objections of the relator, as long as the court determines
that the proposed settlement is fair. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B).  Most
relevant to the present suit, the government has the right to dismiss the
action, notwithstanding the relator’s objection, if the relator is afforded
notice and a hearing. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
Id.
In fact, the Sequoia court concluded that the 1986 amendments “actually increased,
rather than decreased, executive control over qui tam lawsuits,” and explained that
“the government’s power to dismiss or settle an action is broad.” Id. (discussing
the impact of the 1986 amendments on the government’s power over qui tam
cases).  In support of its proposition that the 1986 amendments increased the gov-
ernment’s control of qui tam cases, the court pointed to the government’s power
12
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Ninth Circuit found support for the district court’s conclusion that even a
meritorious case could be dismissed because Congress intended for the
FCA to “create only a limited check on prosecutorial discretion to ensure
suits are not dropped without legitimate governmental purpose.”66
Turning to the issue of the standard of review governing a motion to
dismiss, the Sequoia court first noted that the FCA itself does not create a
particular standard.67  The court then found that the district court acted
reasonably by utilizing the following two-part rational relation standard to
assess “the justification for dismissal: (1) identification of a valid govern-
ment purpose; and (2) a rational relation between dismissal and accom-
plishment of the purpose.”68  The Ninth Circuit then stated that “[i]f the
government satisfies the two-step test, the burden switches to the relator
‘to demonstrate that dismissal is fraudulent, arbitrary and capricious, or
illegal.’”69  The court cited the Senate report to the 1986 amendments,
“which explained that the relators may object if the government moves to
dismiss without reason.”70  With regard to whether the rational relation
standard would impermissibly grant the judiciary approval authority over
the government’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the Sequoia court
held that there is no separation of powers issue because the rational rela-
tion test “require[s] no greater justification of the dismissal motion than is
mandated by the Constitution.”71  Finally, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
application of the rational relation standard to the case and concluded
that the government had met its burden of showing that dismissal was ra-
tionally related to a legitimate government interest.72
to intervene, its supervisory power over the relator, and its power to stay the rela-
tor’s discovery. Id. (discussing factors that support the government’s control over
qui tam cases).
66. Id. at 1144–45 (noting that the Senate report to the 1986 amendments
states that qui tam plaintiffs act “as a check that the Government does not neglect
evidence, cause undue delay, or drop the false claims case without legitimate rea-
son.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 25–26 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5291)).
67. See id. at 1145 (noting that the FCA does not specify a standard of review
and rejecting relators’ argument that the applicable standard is Rule 41(a)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Se-
quoia Orange v. Sunland Packing House Co., 912 F. Supp. 1325, 1341 (E.D. Cal.
1995)).
69. Id. (quoting Sequoia Orange, 912 F. Supp. at 1347).
70. Id. at 1145 (citing S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 26 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5291).
71. Id. at 1146 (citing United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296,
1298–99 (9th Cir. 1992)) (relying on the Ninth Circuit’s previous decision in
United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993), in which the court
opined that giving the judiciary authority to approve government decisions to dis-
miss qui tam actions does not significantly diminish the Executive Branch’s
prosecutorial authority).
72. See id. at 1146–47 (rejecting relators’ various arguments that the govern-
ment’s reasons for dismissal were not rationally related to a legitimate government
interest).
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In Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co.,73 the Tenth Circuit weighed in on the
appropriate standard of review for DOJ dismissals of qui tam actions and
adopted the Sequoia approach.74  The Ridenour court concluded that this
standard “recognizes the constitutional prerogative of the Government
under the Take Care Clause, comports with legislative history, and pro-
tects the rights of relators to judicial review of a government motion to
dismiss.”75  The court explained that the Sequoia standard does not estab-
lish a high bar for dismissals because “it is enough that there are plausible,
or arguable, reasons supporting the agency decision.”76  The Ridenour
73. 397 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2005).  The case involved the Rocky Flats nuclear
weapons manufacturing facility in Colorado that was in operation from 1953
through 1992. Id. at 929.  In 1989, the facility was designated by the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) as a Superfund site under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). Id.  The
site was to be decontaminated and closed by 2006. Id.  During the decontamina-
tion efforts, relators voiced concerns about weak security and together they filed a
qui tam suit under the FCA, alleging that the contractors responsible for security
on the site “were paid for security measures they either did not provide or pro-
vided below acceptable levels.” Id. at 929–30.  After investigating the suit for over
two years, the government filed a motion to dismiss arguing that “the lawsuit would
delay the cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats, as well as compromise national secur-
ity interests by risking inadvertent disclosure of classified information.” Id. at 930.
“After a five-day evidentiary hearing . . . in which the Government stipulated for
purposes of the hearing that the Relators’ claims were meritorious, the magistrate
recommended the Government’s motion to dismiss be granted.” Id.  The district
court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation and the relators appealed to the
Tenth Circuit. Id.
74. See id. at 935 (noting that the FCA is silent as to the standard of review for
a government motion to dismiss a qui tam action).  Before addressing the standard
of review for government motions to dismiss, the court first explained that prior
intervention is not necessary for the government to file a motion to dismiss. Id. at
932–35.
75. Id. at 936.  In deciding not to adopt Swift, the Ridenour court highlighted
the distinguishing fact that in Swift the defendant had not been served, unlike the
situation in Ridenour, stating:
We do not decide at this time whether § 3730(c)(2)(A) gives the judiciary
the right to pass judgment on the Government’s decision to dismiss an
action where the defendant has not been served and where the Govern-
ment did not intervene in the action, facts of the sort presented in Swift.
Id. at 936 n.17.  Subsequently, when presented with a defendant who had not been
served, like in Swift, the Tenth Circuit did not adopt either Swift or Sequoia in that
situation, concluding: “We need not resolve this question because even under the
greater judicial scrutiny imposed by the Sequoia standard, the government’s motion
to dismiss passes muster in this case.”  United States ex rel. Wickliffe v. EMC Corp.,
473 F. App’x 849, 853 (10th Cir. 2012).
76. Ridenour, 397 F.3d at 937 (quoting United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange
Co. v. Sunland Packing House Co., 912 F. Supp. 1325, 1341 (E.D. Ca. 1995)).  In
the Ridenour court’s view, the government advanced a “plausible or arguable” rea-
son for dismissal because in addition to the risk of inadvertent disclosure of classi-
fied information, the government demonstrated that
the litigation would delay the clean-up [effort] . . . by requiring the reas-
signment of personnel from the project to a review of classified docu-
ments for declassification or redaction in aid of litigation, and by placing
an added financial burden on the project through a requirement to shift
14
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court found that the government satisfied the test by providing a “plausi-
ble or arguable” reason for dismissal.77
In addition to the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, district courts within the
Third and Seventh Circuits have also followed the Sequoia rational relation
test.78  The D.C. Circuit, however, did not agree with this approach and
funds from clean-up to litigation.
Id. at 937.  The government presented to the district court a cost–benefit analysis
that established “the benefits that might be obtained by successful prosecution of
the qui tam action were outweighed by the risk the litigation would divert resources
from the clean-up effort and delay closure of Rocky Flats.” Id. at 937 n.20.
77. Id. at 936–37.  The government argued and the court agreed that “pro-
tecting classified information from disclosure and the timely closing of the con-
taminated Rocky Flats facility are valid governmental purposes supporting its
motion to dismiss the qui tam action.” Id. at 936 (footnote omitted).  In reaching
its result, the court considered the magistrate judge’s finding that “the risk of inad-
vertent disclosure, even if theoretically minimal, as the Relators argued, was suffi-
cient to justify dismissal of the action.” Id. at 937.
78. See United States ex rel. Panzey Belgium Harris v. EMD Serono, Inc., 370 F.
Supp. 3d 483, 488 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (adopting the Sequoia rational relation standard
after finding it more persuasive than the Swift standard).  The EMD Serono court,
within the Third Circuit, found that “[t]he rational relationship standard accords
with statutory interpretation and fosters transparency.  It is consistent with the con-
stitutional scheme of checks and balances.” Id. at 488.  Further, the court ex-
plained that if the government had an “unfettered” right to dismiss, then the
hearing required by the statute would be superfluous. Id.  In applying the Sequoia
test, the court found that the government “has a valid interest in avoiding litigation
costs in a case that lacks sufficient factual and legal support” and where “the rela-
tors’ allegations ‘conflict with important policy and enforcement prerogatives of
the federal government’s healthcare programs.’” Id. at 489 (citation omitted).
Thus, the court ruled that the government had satisfied the rational relationship
test, and that the relators failed to show that the government’s decision was arbi-
trary or capricious. Id. at 489–90.  The court concluded by stating that “[t]he rea-
sons given by the government are not a cover for an illegitimate reason and do not
mask an animus toward the corporate relator . . . .  The government is entitled to
do a cost/benefit analysis to decide whether to pursue a case, even a meritorious
one.” Id. at 491; see also United States ex rel. Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Ctr. of
Del., 938 F.3d 384, 387 (3d Cir. 2019) (declining to “take a side in [the] circuit
split because [the relator] fails even the more restrictive [Sequoia] standard”).
Within the Seventh Circuit, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Illinois recently followed Sequoia and found that the government did not ade-
quately investigate the relator’s claim in order to support the purported govern-
ment purpose. See United States ex rel. CIMZNHCA, LLC v. UCB, Inc., No. 17-CV-
765-SMY-MAB, 2019 WL 1598109, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2019), appeal docketed,
No.19-2273 (7th Cir. July 8, 2019).  The court stated that “[u]nder the circum-
stances, one could reasonably conclude that the proffered reasons for the decision
to dismiss are pretextual and the Government’s true motivation is animus toward
the relator.” Id. at *4.  Within the Ninth Circuit, two recent district court cases
applying the Sequoia standard have garnered a great deal of attention because in
one case, the judge took the previously unprecedented step of permitting continu-
ation of a qui tam action that the government sought to dismiss. See United States
ex rel. Thrower v. Acad. Mortg. Corp., No. 16-CV-02120-EMC, 2018 WL 3208157
(N.D. Cal. June 29, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16408 (9th Cir. July 27, 2018).
The same judge who decided Thrower subsequently granted a DOJ motion to dis-
miss under the Sequoia standard finding that the government had meaningfully
considered the costs and benefits of proceeding with the case, thereby demonstrat-
15
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rejected the Sequoia standard.79
E. When the DOJ Blows the Whistle, the Game Is over: The D.C. Circuit’s
“Unfettered Right” Standard
Five years after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sequoia, the D.C. Cir-
cuit considered the appropriate standard governing DOJ dismissals of qui
tam actions in Swift v. United States,80 decided in 2003.81  In Swift, the rela-
tor brought a qui tam action against one current and two former employ-
ees of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, claiming that they
had conspired to defraud the government in violation of the FCA.82  With-
out intervening, the government filed a motion to dismiss the case be-
cause the amount of money at stake ($6,169.20) did not outweigh the
expense of the litigation, even if the allegations proved to have merit.83
The district court applied the Sequoia rational relation test and granted the
government’s motion to dismiss.84  On appeal, the relator argued that the
government could not dismiss without first intervening and that “the gov-
ernment did not justify its decision to dismiss.”85
ing a rational basis for its decision to seek dismissal. See United States ex rel.
Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00941, 2019 WL 5722618 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
5, 2019).  The DOJ’s motion to dismiss Gilead was highlighted in a September 4,
2019, letter that Senator Charles Grassley, Chair of the Senate Finance Committee,
sent to U.S. Attorney General William Barr challenging the DOJ’s increased use of
its dismissal authority after issuance of the Granston Memo. See Letter from
Charles Grassley, Senator, U.S. Senate, to William Barr, Attorney Gen. (Sept. 4,
2019), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2019-09-
04%20CEG%20to%20DOJ%20%28FCA%20dismissals%29.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AML4-GUFC].  The DOJ responded to Senator Grassley in December
2019, reporting that from January 1, 2018 to December 19, 2019, the DOJ had filed
forty-five motions to dismiss qui tam cases out of more than 1,170 whistleblower
actions that were filed during that period. See Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assis-
tant Attorney Gen., to Charles Grassley, Senator, U.S. Senate (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/-/media/files/perspectives/publications/
2020/01/doj-response-to-senator-grassley.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT4X-U4FB].
“The fact that we have sought to dismiss fewer than 4% of cases reflects our serious
commitment to allow appropriate qui tam matters to proceed.” Id. at 3.
79. See Swift, 318 F.3d at 252–53 (rejecting the Sequoia standard).
80. 318 F.3d 250 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
81. See Health Choice All., LLC ex rel. United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 5:17-
CV-123-RWS-CMC, 2019 WL 2520165, at *5 (E.D. Tex. May 16, 2019) (citing Swift,
318 F.3d 250) (noting that, subsequent to the Sequoia decision in 1998, the next
circuit court to consider whether a lower court was correct to apply the Sequoia
rational relation test was the D.C. Circuit in Swift).
82. See Swift, 318 F.3d at 250.
83. See id. at 251.
84. See id. (noting that the district court found “that the government had
demonstrated that dismissal was rationally related to a valid governmental
purpose”).
85. Id. (listing the relator’s arguments on appeal).  The relator in Swift also
argued that dismissal was improper because the government did not investigate
her claims and “that the district court erred in denying her discovery and in refus-
ing to unseal the record.” Id. (reviewing the relator’s arguments).  The D.C. Cir-
16
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In its opinion, the D.C. Circuit first concluded that the government
need not intervene before dismissing the action and noted that, even if
there were such a requirement, the government’s motion to dismiss could
be construed as a motion to intervene.86  The Swift court then proceeded
to reject the Sequoia test because it did not believe that section
3730(c)(2)(A) of the FCA gave the Judicial Branch general oversight of
the Executive Branch’s judgment.87  Noting that the government’s deci-
sion to dismiss a case amounts to a determination not to prosecute, the
court cited U.S. Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedent establishing
the presumption that such decisions are unreviewable.88  Finally, the court
stated that giving the government “an unfettered right to dismiss an ac-
tion” is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(a), which
allows for dismissal “without order of the court” and not subject to judicial
review.89
The Swift court viewed the relator’s right to a hearing under section
3730(c)(2)(A) as the only indication that the courts have a role in decid-
ing whether a qui tam case can proceed in spite of the government’s deci-
sion to dismiss it.90  In analyzing the judiciary’s role, the D.C. Circuit
explained that “[t]he Constitution entrusts the Executive with duty to
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’  The decision whether to
bring an action on behalf of the United States is therefore ‘a decision
generally committed to [the government’s] absolute discretion.’”91  As ad-
ditional support for its “unfettered right” approach, the Swift court found
that “[n]othing in § 3730(c)(2)(A) purports to deprive the Executive
Branch of its historical prerogative to decide which cases should go for-
ward in the name of the United States.”92  Therefore, according to the
D.C. Circuit, the function of the court hearing “is simply to give the relator
a formal opportunity to convince the government not to end the case.”93
cuit rejected these arguments as well. See id. at 254.
86. See id. at 252 (concluding that “the question whether the False Claims Act
requires the government to intervene before dismissing an action is largely
academic”).
87. See id. (explaining section 3730(c)(2)(A) provides that “ ‘[t]he Govern-
ment’—meaning the Executive Branch, not the Judicial—‘may dismiss the action,’
which at least suggests the absence of judicial constraint” (quoting 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(c)(2) (2010))).
88. See id. at 252 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–33 (1985); New-
man v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
89. Id. (citing Randall v. Merrill Lynch, 820 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
90. Id. at 253.
91. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3; Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831).
92. See id. at 252 (stating that section 3730(c)(2)(A) of the FCA “neither sets
‘substantive priorities’ nor circumscribes the government’s ‘power to discriminate
among issues or cases it will pursue’” (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833)).
93. Id. at 253 (rejecting the Sequoia court’s rationale).  The Swift court noted
the government’s concession at oral argument that there may be an exception for
“fraud on the court,” but found no evidence of fraudulent conduct toward the
court had been presented. Id.  Therefore, the court bypassed the question of
“whether this type of exception, or any other, might be consistent with our reading
17
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The D.C. Circuit disregarded the Senate report that the Sequoia court
referenced in support of its rational relation standard.94  The Swift court
explained that the portion of the Senate report cited in Sequoia related to
an unenacted version of the 1986 amendments.95  The D.C. Circuit con-
cluded that, even if the Sequoia test was the proper standard, the govern-
ment satisfied it because dismissal achieved the government’s legitimate
objective of minimizing expenses.96  Moreover, the Swift court found that
the relator had not established “that the government’s prosecutorial judg-
ment was arbitrary and capricious, illegal, or fraudulent.”97
of § 3730(c)(2)(A).” Id.  In a later case, the D.C. Circuit mentioned that “fraud on
the court” is a possible exception to the government’s unfettered right to dismiss
qui tam actions. See Hoyte v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 518 F.3d 61, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
94. See Swift, 318 F.3d at 253 (discussing the Sequoia court’s reliance on a Sen-
ate committee report, which stated a relator may object if the government moved
to dismiss without legitimate reasons).
95. See id. (stating that the unenacted version of the Senate report read: “If
the Government proceeds with the action . . . the [relator] shall be permitted to
file objections with the court and to petition for an evidentiary hearing to object to
. . . any motion to dismiss filed by the Government” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 42 (1986))).  The court explained that
even if the Senate version had been enacted, the Senate report would still not
support the Sequoia standard because the government had not elected to proceed
but rather elected to dismiss the case. Id.
96. See id. at 254 (noting the government’s argument that if relator proceeded
with the action, the government would still need to expend resources monitoring
the case and complying with discovery requests).
97. Id. (explaining that the relator offered nothing to support the assertation
that the government’s reasons for dismissal were pretextual).  The defendants in
Swift had not been served with the complaint. Id. at 251.  The D.C. Circuit subse-
quently held that its “unfettered right” interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)
also applied in cases where the defendant had been served. See Hoyte, 518 F.3d at
65.  In Hoyte, the D.C. Circuit further explained its Swift decision, noting that “[i]t
is clear from Swift that any exception to section 3730(c)(2)(A)—if there are any—
must be like ‘fraud on the court’ and Hoyte’s proposed ‘manifest public interest’
exception is not.” Id.  The Hoyte court held that the government’s “decision to
dismiss the case, based on its own assessment, is not reviewable in the district court
or this court.” Id.  The D.C. Circuit also applied the Swift “unfettered discretion”
standard to dismiss a qui tam action in United States ex rel. Schneider v. J.P. Morgan
Chase Bank, N.A., No. 19-7025, 2019 WL 4566462, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 22, 2019)
(per curiam), cert. denied, No. 19-678, 2020 WL 1668623 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2020).  In
denying certiorari, the Supreme Court recently declined to rule on the Sequoia
versus Swift circuit split, perhaps because the different standards have not yet been
outcome-determinative in appellate courts. See Allon Kedem, Paula Ramer &
David Russell, Supreme Court Declines to Hear Dispute over Proper Review Standard
in Government FCA Dismissals, ARNOLD & PORTER (Apr. 15, 2020), https://
www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/blogs/fca-qui-notes/posts/2020/04/su-
preme-court-declines-to-hear-dispute-over [https://perma.cc/Z2TH-25PP].
[N]o circuit has yet overturned a district court’s grant of . . . [a DOJ
motion to dismiss a qui tam case], nor upheld a denial.  Until that hap-
pens, the Court may be content to sit on the sidelines.  For that reason,
we will be watching with particular interest two cases in which the govern-
ment has appealed from decisions denying motions under
§ 3730(c)(2)(A): United States ex rel. Thrower v. Academy Mortgage Corp., No.
18-16408 (9th Cir.), and United States v. CIMZNHCA, LLC, No. 19-2273
18
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Except for the Tenth Circuit in Ridenour, no other circuit court has
expressly weighed in on the Sequoia versus Swift controversy.98  Neverthe-
less, in Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital,99 the Fifth Circuit “all but ex-
plicitly stated that the government’s decision to dismiss a qui tam false
claim case is its choice alone.”100  Following the Riley court’s strong indica-
tion that it would adopt the Swift standard, a number of district courts
within the Fifth Circuit recently adopted the Swift unfettered right ap-
proach.101  In addition, several district courts within the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits adopted the Swift standard.102  Many of these cases, as well as nu-
(7th Cir.).  Should either circuit affirm, the likelihood of Supreme Court
intervention could increase substantially.
Id.
98. See Health Choice All., LLC ex rel. United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 5:17-
CV-123-RWS-CMC, 2019 WL 2520165, at *6 (E.D. Tex. May 16, 2019) (citing
Nasuti ex rel. United States v. Savage Farms, Inc., No. CIV.A. 12-30121-GAO, 2014
WL 1327015, at *10 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2014), aff’d, No. 14-1362, 2015 WL 9598315
(1st Cir. Mar. 12, 2015)) (noting that as of May 16, 2019, “[t]he only other circuit
to weigh in on the controversy, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, has sided with
the Ninth Circuit”).
99. 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).  Sitting en banc, the Riley court
considered whether the FCA’s provision permitting relators to proceed with qui
tam litigation after the government declined to intervene unconstitutionally in-
fringed on the Executive’s power to conduct litigation on behalf of the United
States. Id. at 752 (discussing the importance of qui tam actions in American and
English history).  In holding that the qui tam provisions of the FCA did not violate
the U.S. Constitution, the court used language similar to the D.C. Circuit in Swift,
acknowledging the Executive Branch’s “extraordinarily wide discretion in deciding
whether to prosecute,” id. at 756, and highlighting the government’s “unliteral
power to dismiss an action ‘notwithstanding the objection of the [relator].’” Id. at
753 (quoting Searcy v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir.
1997)).
100. United States ex rel. Sibley v. Delta Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. 4:17-cv-000053-
GHD-RP, 2019 WL 1305069, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 21, 2019) (rejecting the rela-
tor’s argument that the Fifth Circuit would follow the Sequoia approach).
101. See id. (citing Searcy, 117 F.3d at 155, 159; Riley, 252 F.3d at 744–45)
(adopting Swift, the district court in Sibley found that Fifth Circuit precedent
strongly supported following the “unfettered discretion” approach).  The Sibley
court went on to state that dismissal is warranted even under the Sequoia standard.
Id. at *8 (concluding that the government satisfied both steps of the Sequoia stan-
dard); see also United States ex rel. De Sessa v. Dallas Cty. Hosp. Dist., No. 3:17-CV-
1782-K, 2019 WL 2225072, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2019) (citing Riley, 252 F.3d at
753) (adopting the Swift standard and concluding that, even under the Sequoia
approach, the government satisfied that test and the relator did not demonstrate
that the dismissal was “fraudulent, arbitrary and capricious, or illegal”); Eli Lilly,
2019 WL 2520165, at *4 (citing Sibley, 2019 WL 1305069, at *5) (stating that Fifth
Circuit caselaw “establishes that the government possesses virtually ‘unfettered dis-
cretion’ to dismiss a qui tam False Claims Act action”).
102. See United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Ball Homes, LLC, No. CV. 5: 17-
379-DCR, 2018 WL 3213614 (E.D. Ky. June 29, 2018) (applying the Swift standard
in a district court within the Sixth Circuit); United States ex. rel. Levine v. Avnet,
Inc., No. 2:14-CV017 (WOB-CJS), 2015 WL 1499519 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 1, 2015)
(same).  The court in Levine agreed with the D.C. Circuit that the government has
a “virtually unfettered right” to dismiss the case, explaining that “[t]he statute’s
plain language says nothing about the Government needing to make any sort of
19
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merous district court cases that recently followed the Sequoia approach,
were decided subsequent to the issuance of the Granston Memo, demon-
strating that courts are increasingly grappling with the effects of the DOJ’s
more aggressive posture in moving to dismiss qui tam actions.103
F. The Refs Reassert Their Authority: The Granston Memo and Its Effects
On January 10, 2018, Michael Granston issued his memorandum that
generated increased focus on the Sequoia versus Swift circuit split.104  The
showing to support its decision to dismiss.” Levine, 2015 WL 1499519, at *4.  The
court found that, even if the stricter Sequoia standard were applied, the govern-
ment met that standard by asserting its interest in preserving scarce resources. Id.
at *5.  Thus, the court granted the government’s motion to dismiss. Id.  In Maldo-
nado, the court followed Levine, emphasizing that “the plain language of the statute
says nothing about the government being required to make any sort of showing in
support of its motion to dismiss.” Maldonado, 2018 WL 3213614, at *3 (citing Le-
vine, 2015 WL 1499519, at *4).  The court found that, even if it applied the more
stringent Sequoia standard, the government’s motion would be granted because the
government would still be required to participate if the case went forward, and
also, “the government has a valid interest in reining in weak qui tam actions.” Id.
One court in the Eighth Circuit adopted this standard as well. See United States ex
rel. Davis v. Hennepin County, No. 18-CV-01551 (ECT/HB), 2019 WL 608848 (D.
Minn. Feb. 13, 2019) (supporting the Swift approach).  In Davis, the court stated
that the Swift standard is more consistent with the text of the statute and the U.S.
Constitution, but found that dismissal was warranted under either standard. Id. at
*5–8.  The court explained that, under the statute, all that is required is that the
relators be notified of the motion and that they receive the opportunity for a hear-
ing. Id. at *6.  The court found that, if it applied Sequoia, the government’s
cost–benefit analysis is a legitimate government reason and dismissal is rationally
related to that objective. Id.  Further, the relators did not show that dismissal was
“fraudulent, arbitrary and capricious, or illegal.” Id. at *7.
103. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 11-CV-
00941-EMC, 2019 WL5722618 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2019) (following Sequoia and
granting the DOJ’s motion to dismiss post-Granston Memo); Eli Lilly, 2019 WL
2520165 (adopting the Swift standard and granting the DOJ’s motion to dismiss
post-Granston Memo); United States ex rel. CIMZNHCA v. UCB, Inc., No. 17-CV-
765-SMY-MAB, 2019 WL 1598109 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-
2273 (7th Cir. July 8, 2019) (following Sequoia and denying the DOJ’s motion to
dismiss post-Granston Memo); United States ex rel. Panzey Belgium Harris v. EMD
Serono, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 3d 483 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (following Sequoia and granting
the DOJ’s motion to dismiss post-Granston Memo); Sibley, 2019 WL 1305069
(adopting the Swift standard and granting the DOJ’s motion to dismiss post-Grans-
ton Memo); Davis, 2019 WL 608848 (supporting the Swift approach and granting
the DOJ’s motion to dismiss post-Granston Memo); Maldonado, 2018 WL 3213614
(adopting the Swift standard and granting the DOJ’s motion to dismiss post-Grans-
ton Memo); United States ex rel. Thrower v. Acad. Mortg. Corp., No 16-CV-02120-
EMC, 2018 WL 3208157 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16408
(9th Cir. July 27, 2018) (following Sequoia and denying the DOJ’s motion to dismiss
post-Granston Memo).
104. See Granston Memo, supra note 7, at 1 (providing factors for evaluating
DOJ dismissals pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)).  In September 2018, the
Justice Department “formally incorporated Granston memo criteria into the Jus-
tice Manual.”  Jonathan Cedarbaum, Disputes Heating up over Gov’t Qui Tam Dismis-
sal Authority, LAW360 (Feb. 15, 2019, 4:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1129837/disputes-heating-up-over-gov-t-qui-tam-dismissal-authority [https://
20
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memo first noted the record increases in qui tam actions filed over the last
several years.105  Because the government is forced to expend substantial
resources on these actions even in cases where it does not intervene, the
Granston Memo advocates for DOJ attorneys to consider whether the gov-
ernment’s interests would be better served by dismissing qui tam cases.106
Granston pointed out that the DOJ “plays an important gatekeeper role in
protecting the False Claims Act.”107
Speaking at the American Health Lawyers Association Annual Meet-
ing on June 24, 2019, Granston stated that at least thirty FCA cases had
been dismissed since the DOJ adopted the guidance in his memo encour-
aging government lawyers to seek dismissal of non-intervened qui tam
actions when appropriate.108  Reporting on Granston’s speech, commen-
perma.cc/8VEA-5TRK] (noting that the Justice Manual was formerly known as the
U.S. Attorney Manual).
105. See Granston Memo, supra note 7, at 1 (noting that annual totals of qui
tam actions under the FCA approached or exceeded 600 new matters).
106. See id. (“Even in non-intervened cases, the government expends signifi-
cant resources in monitoring the cases and sometimes must produce discovery or
otherwise participate.”); see also Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 26, United States v. United States ex rel.
Thrower, No. 18-16408 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2019) (citing Brief of the Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13, Gilead
Sciences, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Campie, No. 17-936 (U.S. Feb 1, 2018)) (ex-
plaining that “of the 2,086 cases in which the government declined to intervene
between 2004 and 2013 and that ended with zero recovery, 278 of them lasted for
more than three years after the government declined and 110 of those extended
for more than five years after declination”).
107. Granston Memo, supra note 7 (explaining that, because the relators
largely stand in the shoes of the Attorney General when the DOJ declines to inter-
vene, the government should consider using 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) to protect
the FCA).  The Granston Memo sets forth the following seven factors that the DOJ
should considering in evaluating whether to seek dismissals of a qui tam action
(noting that the factors are not mutually exclusive, and the department relies on
multiple grounds for dismissal):
(1) “Curbing Meritless Qui Tams” that facially lack merit either because of a
defective legal theory or frivolous factual allegations. Id. at 3;
(2) “Preventing Parasitic or Opportunistic Qui Tam Actions” that duplicate
pre-existing government investigations and provide no additional useful
information to the investigation. Id. at 4;
(3) “Preventing Interference with Agency Policies and Programs.” Id. at 4–5;
(4) “Controlling Litigation Brought on Behalf of the United States” in order
to protect the DOJ’s litigation prerogatives. Id. at 5;
(5) “Safeguarding Classified Information and National Security Interests.” Id.
at 6;
(6) “Preserving Government Resources” especially when the government’s
costs (e.g., for monitoring ongoing litigation or responding to discovery
requests) are likely to exceed any expected gain. Id. at 6; and
(7) “Addressing Egregious Procedural Errors” that could frustrate the DOJ’s
efforts to conduct a proper investigation. Id. at 7.
108. See Crawford, supra note 17 (reporting on Michael Granston’s speech on
June 24, 2019, which discussed the current split in the courts regarding the stan-
dards for dismissal and described the impact of the NHCA lawsuits in exacerbating
that split).
21
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tators pointed out that “[t]his uptick in the number of dismissals granted
under . . . Section 3730(c)(2)(A) authority is a notable departure from the
past when this provision was used in less than 1% of all cases.”109  As the
DOJ has moved to dismiss more FCA cases, including many filed by profes-
sional relators, the circuit split over Sequoia versus Swift has significantly
widened.110
III. OVERRULING THE REFS: NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF RECENT,
UNPRECEDENTED CASES CHALLENGING DOJ DISMISSALS
As illustrated by Ridenour, the Sequoia rational relation test is not a
high bar.111  Thus, in the past, the standard that courts applied did not
particularly matter because the government’s motions to dismiss were al-
ways granted.112  The DOJ’s winning streak ended, however, in the 2018
109. Id. (citing Steven Schooner, False Claims Act: Greater DOJ Scrutiny of Frivo-
lous Qui Tam Actions?, 32 NASH & CIBINIC REPORT ¶ 20 (2018)).  In addition to
initiating a DOJ policy change, the Granston Memo also had the effect of changing
the strategy of defendants in qui tam actions. See Positive FCA Enforcement Trend for
Defense Contractors: DOJ Reaffirms Commitment to Exercise Statutory Authority to Dismiss,
MCGUIREWOODS (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/client-re-
sources/Alerts/2019/2/positive-fca-enforcement-trend-defense-contractors
[https://perma.cc/5BEG-3HK9] (stating that “defendants should analyze the ap-
plication of the Granston Memo factors in any new matter to determine whether
there is a possibility of terminating litigation at a stage that would avoid costly
discovery and litigation”); see also Brian Tully McLaughlin, Jason M. Crawford, Sa-
rah Hill & Payal Nanavati, Feature Comment: The Top FCA Developments of 2018, 61
GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 15 (2019) (“[A] year ago, few defendants would have consid-
ered asking the Government to move to dismiss—rather, persuading DOJ to de-
cline to intervene was commensurate to winning the brass ring.  But the current
trend suggests that requests for § 3730(c)(2)(A) motions may be a new tool in the
defendant’s toolbox in certain situations, including cases where the Government
will bear significant discovery costs . . . .”).  Speaking at a conference staged by the
Federal Bar Association in Washington, D.C., in February 2019, Granston warned
defendants against unduly increasing the government’s burden, stating that “pur-
suing undue or excessive discovery will not constitute a successful strategy for get-
ting the government to exercise its dismissal authority.” See Jeff Overley, DOJ Atty
Warns FCA Targets on Discovery Tactics, LAW360 (Mar. 1, 2019, 10:39 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/1134479/doj-atty-warns-fca-targets-on-discovery-tactics
[https://perma.cc/5MRB-PGG9] (discussing Michael Granston’s speech at an
FCA conference put on by the Federal Bar Association in Washington, D.C., ex-
plaining that the message was that “defendants shouldn’t necessarily feel that they
can scare the government into dismissing cases,” and reporting that Granston
“made clear that his memo has real teeth for FCA whistleblowers”).
110. For a discussion of recent cases highlighting the significance of resolving
the Sequoia versus Swift split, see infra notes 118–134 and accompanying text.
111. See Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 F.3d 925, 937 (10th Cir. 2005) (not-
ing that “to establish a rational relationship to a valid government purpose,
‘[t]here need not be a tight fitting relationship between the two; it is enough that
there are plausible, or arguable, reasons supporting the agency decision’” (quot-
ing United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing House Co., 912 F.
Supp. 1325, 1341 (E.D. Cal. 1995))).
112. See Reply Brief for the United States at 2, United States v. United States ex
rel. Thrower, No. 18-16408 (9th Cir. July 27, 2018) (“Before the order on appeal,
no court had ever permitted the continuation of a qui tam action in the United
22
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Northern District of California case United States ex rel. Thrower v. Academy
Mortgage Corp.,113 in which Judge Edward Chen denied the government’s
motion to dismiss.114  In Thrower, as well as in a recent case filed by a pro-
fessional relator, United States ex rel. CIMZNHCA v. UCB, Inc.,115 district
courts second-guessed DOJ decisions to seek dismissal of qui tam ac-
tions.116  These unprecedented court challenges to DOJ dismissal author-
ity are particularly significant in light of numerous cases recently filed by
professional relators, including CIMZNHCA, which severely test the gov-
ernment’s ability to rein in qui tam cases that may not be in the public’s
best interest.117
A. The Cases that Changed the Game—Thrower and CIMZNHCA
In Thrower, one of the two recent decisions in which the court denied
the DOJ’s motion to dismiss a qui tam case, the relator alleged that Acad-
emy Mortgage violated the FCA by falsely certifying loans for government
insurance.118  The government moved to dismiss, arguing that dismissal
would allow it to achieve a valid government purpose of conserving re-
sources that the litigation would otherwise consume.119  The relator re-
sponded by claiming that the government failed to conduct a sufficient
cost-benefit analysis to satisfy the first step of the Sequoia test.120  Judge
Chen agreed with the relator and found that the government failed to
comply with the first step of the Sequoia test because it did not conduct “a
minimally adequate investigation.”121  The government has appealed the
decision, contending that “courts have no license to second-guess the de-
States’ name that the United States sought to end.”).
113. No. 16-cv-02120-EMC, 2018 WL 3208157 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2018), ap-
peal docketed, No. 18-16408 (9th Cir. July 27, 2018).
114. See id. at *3 (finding that the government did not fully investigate the
relator’s amended complaint).
115. No. 17-CV-765-SMY-MAB, 2019 WL 1598109 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2019), ap-
peal docketed, No. 19-2273 (7th Cir. July 8, 2019).
116. For a discussion of these two recent cases, see infra notes 118–125 and
accompanying text.
117. For a discussion of the recent cases filed by professional relators, see
infra notes 126–134 and accompanying text.
118. See United States ex. rel. Thrower v. Acad. Mortg. Corp., 2018 WL
3208157, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16408 (9th Cir.
July 27, 2018).  The government declined to intervene in the initial complaint, and
after the relator amended the complaint, the government moved to dismiss with-
out investigating the amended complaint at all. Id.
119. See id. at *3.
120. See id. (“In particular, [relator] argues that the Government failed to
consider and meaningfully assess the potential proceeds from the suit, i.e., the
‘benefit’ of the cost-benefit analysis.”).
121. Id. (finding that, even if the government had prevailed on the first Se-
quoia step, the relator met the burden-shifting requirement to show that the dis-
missal was “fraudulent, arbitrary and capricious, or illegal” because the amended
complaint had not been fully investigated).
23
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gree of investigation the United States makes before it exercises its statu-
tory right to dismiss.”122
In CIMZNHCA, an FCA case brought by a professional relator against
pharmaceutical defendants, a federal judge sitting in the Southern District
of Illinois followed Judge Chen’s lead and denied the DOJ’s motion to
dismiss because the government did not perform a cost-benefit analysis of
the likely costs versus the potential recovery.123  Despite the DOJ’s conten-
tion that the professional relator’s allegations conflicted with important
policy and enforcement prerogatives of government healthcare programs,
the court concluded that the DOJ’s decision to dismiss was arbitrary and
capricious, observing that “one could reasonably conclude” that the gov-
ernment’s true motivation was “animus toward the relator.”124  As it did
with Thrower, the DOJ promptly appealed the CIMZNHCA decision.125
B. Alleged Flagrant Fouls by Professional Relators: The NHCA Cases
The CIMZNHCA case was one of twelve qui tam lawsuits filed by enti-
ties affiliated with National Health Care Analysis Group (NHCA), alleging
essentially the same conduct in “cloned complaints.”126  NHCA is a “pseu-
donym for a partnership comprised of limited liability companies set up by
investors and former Wall Street investment bankers.”127  As evidence of
NHCA’s professional relator status, the DOJ pointed to a description of
the group provided by its managing agent who explained that NHCA was
created to finance  “an experienced healthcare fraud management team
seeking to uncover, investigate, develop and file high value whistleblower
122. Reply Brief for the United States, supra note 112, at 2.  In its reply brief,
the DOJ further argued that the government’s “invocation of Section
3730(c)(2)(A) is an exercise of the Executive Branch’s constitutional responsibility
to take care that federal law is faithfully executed by carefully choosing the cases
through which federal law is enforced.” Id. at 8 (citing Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994)).  In its opening brief, the DOJ
contended that the Sequoia approach was improperly applied by the district court
and noted that the government is “preserv[ing] for further review a challenge to
this Court’s holding in Sequoia Orange regarding the appropriate standard of review
of Section 3730(c)(2)(A) motions.”  Opening Brief for the United States at 21–22
n.4, United States v. United States ex rel. Thrower, No. 16-cv-02120 (9th Cir. Mar.
15, 2019) (No. 18-16408), 2019 WL 1512922.
123. See United States ex rel. CIMZNHCA v. UCB, Inc., No. 17-CV-765-SMY-
MAB, 2019 WL 1598109, at *3–4 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2019) (ruling that the govern-
ment fell “short of a minimally adequate investigation to support the claimed gov-
ernmental purpose”), appeal docketed, No. 19-2273 (7th Cir. July 8, 2019).
124. Id. at *4 (noting that the government’s counsel maintained that disap-
proval of “professional relators” is a valid governmental purpose for dismissal).
125. See Reply Brief for the United States, supra note 112, at 2 n.1 (noting that
the government has appealed to the Seventh Circuit in United States v. United States
ex rel. CIMZNHCA, No. 19-2273 (7th Cir. July 8, 2019)).
126. See United States’ Motion to Dismiss Relator’s Second Amended Com-
plaint, supra note 18, at 3 (“In preparing its numerous complaints, NHCA Group
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lawsuits.  Applying a proven and reproducible method, management in-
tends to build a portfolio of cases that can generate substantial investor
returns over 5 to 10 years.”128
According to the DOJ, NHCA used false pretenses to obtain evidence
for its qui tam litigation business by purporting to conduct a research
study of the pharmaceutical industry to gather information from paid par-
ticipants in the study.129  Per the DOJ, NHCA on its website made no men-
tion of its role in filing numerous qui tam cases, but instead held itself out
to the public as a “healthcare research company that engages in qualitative
research of pharmaceutical and other healthcare-related industries.”130
The DOJ expressed concern regarding the false pretenses that NHCA
used to obtain information from witnesses, citing a Massachusetts qui tam
case that the court dismissed as a sanction after it concluded that miscon-
duct by relator’s attorneys involving a fictitious “research study” violated
several rules of professional conduct.131
In December 2018, the DOJ moved to dismiss all of the pending
NHCA cases on grounds consistent with the factors set forth in the Grans-
ton Memo, such as ensuring that the cases did not interfere with common
industry practices that the government deemed beneficial to federal
healthcare beneficiaries.132  Subsequent to the government’s motions, sev-
128. See Reply Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Motion to Dis-
miss Relator’s Second Amended Complaint at 3, United States ex rel. Health
Choice Grp., LLC v. Bayer Corp., No. 5:17-CV-126-RWS-CMC (E.D. Tex. Feb. 19,
2019) (quoting Declaration of Colin M. Huntley, ¶ 24, Exhibit 2).
129. See United States’ Motion to Dismiss Relator’s Second Amended Com-
plaint, supra note 18, at 5 (stating that NHCA offered to pay individuals “to partici-
pate in what it calls a ‘qualitative research study;’ however, the information is
actually being collected for use in qui tam complaints filed by the NHCA Group
through its pseudonymous limited liability companies” (footnote omitted)).
130. Id. at 5–6 (quoting NAT’L HEALTHCARE ANALYSIS GROUP, http://
www.nhcagroup.com [https://perma.cc/YG8T-WMKY] (last visited June 5, 2020)).
131. See id. at 6 (discussing United States ex rel. Leysock v. Forest Labs., No. CV
12-11354-FDS, 2017 WL 1591833 (D. Mass. Apr. 28, 2017).  According to the DOJ,
in Forest Labs, “relator’s counsel interviewed witnesses as part of a fictitious ‘re-
search study’ that the court found to be part of ‘an elaborate scheme of deceptive
conduct’ designed to obtain specific details to satisfy qui tam pleading require-
ments.” Id. at 6 n.4 (citing Forest Labs, 2017 WL 1591833, at *1).  In another exam-
ple of the DOJ’s concern regarding professional relator misconduct, the
government successfully moved to dismiss a qui tam case in which a hedge fund
portfolio manager allegedly engaged in unlawful securities trading by short-selling
shares of companies he sued while his FCA allegations were still under seal. See
United States ex rel. Borzilleri v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 15-CV-07881 (JMF), 2019 WL
3203000, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2019) (granting the DOJ’s motion to dismiss);
United States’ Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion,
United States ex rel. Borzilleri v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 15-CV-07881-JMF (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
21, 2018) (arguing for dismissal).
132. See Crawford, supra note 17 (explaining the DOJ’s arguments in favor of
dismissal including (1) “allowing the relators to go forward would impose costs
and burdens on the government and waste judicial and government resources”;
(2) “the time needed to monitor nonintervened cases and facilitate discovery re-
quests would divert DOJ resources from meritorious matters”; and (3) “dismissal
25
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eral NHCA cases were voluntarily dismissed.133  In others, however, the
relators contested dismissal and widened the split among district courts
grappling with whether to follow Swift or Sequoia.134
IV. RETAINING THE REF’S POWER: SWIFT SHOULD BE APPLIED TO UPHOLD
THE FCA’S CONSTITUTIONALITY AND FURTHER
PUBLIC POLICY INTERESTS
As demonstrated by the courts in Thrower and CIMZNHCA, some fed-
eral judges have interpreted Sequoia to expand judicial scrutiny of the
DOJ’s dismissal authority by requiring the government to show that it
“fully investigated” the relator’s allegations and conducted an adequate
cost-benefit analysis.135  Such an interpretation is unconstitutional be-
cause it violates the separation of powers principles embedded in Article II
of the Constitution, which provides that the Executive Branch, not the Judi-
cial Branch, “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”136
Moreover, allowing courts to second-guess DOJ decisions to dismiss would
undermine the government’s ability to terminate qui tam cases that are
not in the public’s best interest.137
A. Constitutional Analysis
Throughout the years, federal circuit courts have upheld the constitu-
tionality of qui tam provisions against Article II challenges because the
provisions “accord the executive ‘sufficient control’ over the independent
litigants . . . to ‘ensure that the President is able to perform his constitu-
was appropriate so as not to undermine common industry practices that HHS-OIG
has determined are beneficial to federal health care beneficiaries”); see also United
States Motion to Dismiss Relator’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at
16 (“These relators should not be permitted to indiscriminately advance claims on
behalf of the government against an entire industry that would undermine com-
mon industry practices the federal government has determined are, in this particu-
lar case, appropriate and beneficial to federal healthcare programs and their
beneficiaries.”).
133. See Crawford, supra note 17 (reporting that several NHCA cases were vol-
untarily dismissed following DOJ’s motions to dismiss).
134. See id. (summarizing EMD Serono where the court followed Sequoia and
upheld the DOJ’s dismissal, Eli Lilly where the magistrate judge followed Swift and
recommended that the court grant the DOJ’s request to dismiss, and CIMZNHCA
where the court followed Sequoia and denied DOJ’s motion to dismiss).  For a dis-
cussion of EMD Serono, see supra note 78.  For discussion of Eli Lilly, see supra notes
9, 18, 58, 81, and 98.  For a discussion of CIMZNHCA, see supra notes 123–125 and
accompanying text.
135. For a discussion of recent cases where the courts have required the DOJ
to make this additional showing, see supra notes 118–125 and accompanying text.
136. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3; see Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d
749, 760 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Smith, J., dissenting) (“The Take Care Clause
was designed as a crucial bulwark to the separations of powers and is far from a
dead letter or obsolete relic.”).
137. For a discussion of the public policy considerations that support using
the Swift unfettered right approach, see infra Section IV.B.
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tionally assigned duties.’”138  Specifically, these cases have pointed to the
provisions in the FCA that provide the government with the “ultimate dis-
cretion to take control of the case from a relator and prosecute the case
on its own, or . . . to dismiss the case entirely.”139  For example, in finding
that the FCA’s qui tam provisions did not unconstitutionally infringe upon
the Executive Branch’s power to conduct litigation on behalf of the
United States, the Fifth Circuit in Riley relied upon the fact that the record
in the case was “devoid of any showing that the government’s ability to
exercise its authority has been thwarted in cases where it was not an inter-
venor.”140  The recent cases permitting courts to second-guess DOJ deci-
sions to dismiss qui tam actions have clearly taken away the government’s
“ultimate discretion” to dismiss, and in at least two cases so far, thwarted
the government’s ability to exercise its authority.141  The dissent in Riley
opined that Article II is violated even when a relator is allowed to proceed
after the government has merely declined intervention, noting that “[t]he
requirement that the government obtain court permission to dismiss a qui
tam suit raises serious questions regarding the balance of power between
the Executive and Judicial Branches.”142  Consistent with the Riley dis-
138. Bret Boyce, The Constitutionality of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims
Act Under Article II, 24 FALSE CL. & QUI TAM Q. REV. 10 (2001) (quoting United
States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 751 (9th Cir. 1993)) (discussing the
cases in which the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits rejected Article II chal-
lenges to qui tam provisions in the FCA—i.e., United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell
Int’l Corp., 282 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2002); Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, 196
F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 1999), vacated, 196 F.3d 561 (5th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc, 252
F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001); United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
41 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 1994); and United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743
(9th Cir. 1993)).  In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
the U.S. Supreme Court expressly disclaimed any view with regard to Article II
challenges, reasoning that the petitioner did not argue such a challenge, nor did it
rise to a jurisdictional issue that the court had to resolve sua sponte.  529 U.S. 765,
778 n.8 (2000).
139. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Appellant at 11, United States v. United States ex rel. Thrower, No. 18-16408
(9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2019) (citing Riley, 252 F.3d at 753); see also Boyce, supra note
138.
140. Riley, 252 F.3d at 753 (discussing how the government retains “a signifi-
cant amount of control over the litigation” even when it does not intervene).  In
finding that the FCA’s qui tam provisions did not violate Article II of the Constitu-
tion, the Fifth Circuit also relied upon the principle that “the government retains
unilateral power to dismiss an action ‘notwithstanding the objections of the [rela-
tor].’” Id. (citing Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir.
1997); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A)).
141. See United States ex rel. CIMZNHCA v. UCB, Inc., No. 17-CV-765 SMY-
MAB, 2019 WL 1598109 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2019) (denying the government’s mo-
tion to dismiss), appeal docketed, No. 19-2273 (7th Cir. July 8, 2019); United States ex
rel. Thrower v. Acad. Mortg. Corp., No. 16-CV-02120-EMC, 2018 WL 3208157 (N.D.
Cal. June 29, 2018) (denying the government’s motion to dismiss), appeal docketed,
No. 18-16408 (9th Cir. July 27, 2018).  For a discussion of how the district courts in
Thrower and CIMZNHCA thwarted the government’s ability to exercise its dismissal
authority, see supra notes 118–125 and accompanying text.
142. Riley, 252 F.3d at 763 n.17 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing In re International
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sent’s separation-of-powers concerns, the recent cases denying the govern-
ment’s motions to dismiss allow “unaccountable, self-interested relators
[to be] . . . put in charge of vindicating government rights,” thereby un-
dermining the Executive Branch’s ability to perform its constitutional
duties.143
Moreover, the Supreme Court “has recognized on several occasions
over many years that an [executive] agency’s decision not to prosecute or
enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally
committed to [the executive] agency’s absolute discretion.”144  For many
reasons, courts have found that executive agency decisions are generally
unsuitable for judicial review.145  Consequently, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that the Executive Branch is “far better equipped than the
courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of
its priorities.”146  Therefore, in order to avoid infringing upon the Execu-
tive Branch’s prerogative to decide which cases to take forward in the
name of the United States, courts should follow the Swift  unfettered right
approach.147
Business Machines Corp., in which the Second Circuit stated: “The district court’s
involvement in the Executive Branch’s decision to abandon litigation might im-
pinge upon the doctrine of separation of powers.” 687 F.2d 591, 602 (2d Cir.
1982)).
143. Id. at 766 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing for the unconstitutionality of
the FCA’s qui tam provisions, Judge Smith explained that “[t]he FCA’s most severe
violations of the separation of powers principles embedded in the Take Care
Clause include the fact that unaccountable, self-interested relators are put in
charge of vindicating government rights and that the transparency and controls of
the constitutional system are not in place to influence the outcome of such
litigation”).
144. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (citing United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693
(1974); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454
(1869)).
145. See id. (stating that such decisions “often involve[] a complicated balanc-
ing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within [the executive agency’s]
expertise,” and require the agency to assess “whether agency resources are best
spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts,
whether . . . [the action] best fits the agency’s overall polices, and, indeed, whether
the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all”).
146. Id. at 831–32 (discussing several reasons why enforcement decisions
should be left to agencies).
147. See Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding
that the government has an “unfettered right” to dismiss FCA cases).  Note that,
even under the Swift “unfettered right” approach, the government’s power to dis-
miss may still be limited for “fraud on the court” or due process violations such as
discrimination based on race. See Hoyte v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 518 F.3d 60, 65
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that “fraud on the court” is a possible exception to the
government’s unfettered right to dismiss qui tam cases); Riley v. St. Luke’s Episco-
pal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (stating that the Executive
Branch’s prosecutorial discretion “is checked only by other constitutional provi-
sions such as the prohibition against racial discrimination and a narrow doctrine of
selective prosecution”).
28
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B. Public Policy Considerations
The Swift approach should also be followed for public policy reasons
because it enables the DOJ to exercise its discretion in order to rein in
overreach by professional relators.148  Qui tam litigation is fundamentally
flawed because it is rife with inherent conflicts of interest.149  As one com-
mentator notes, “[b]y offering the successful informer a bounty, qui tam
legislation provides a personal financial interest in the law enforcement
process that often conflicts with other public interests at stake in the litiga-
tion.”150  The conflict of interest present for relators generally will be
greatly exacerbated if FCA cases can be litigated by well-financed profes-
sional relators who promise substantial investor returns and who use false
pretenses to obtain information from witnesses.151  To avoid com-
pounding the conflict of interest inherent in qui tam litigation by permit-
ting professional relators to prosecute cases in the name of the United
States, the DOJ should be permitted “unfettered discretion” to dismiss the
lawsuits it deems not to serve the public interest.152
148. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Whistling Past the Graveyard: Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Programs Dodge Bullets Fighting Financial Crime, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 617,
666 (2019) (noting that “[c]ritics of private rights of action under the FCA com-
plain that such cases attract ‘unscrupulous bounty hunters’ who will not consider
whether such an action is a true benefit to the government and consistent with
agency regulatory goals” (citing SEC, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO 511,
EVALUATION OF THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 28–30 (2013) (Question 7))).
“The FCA addresses these concerns in some respects by shifting authority over the
case to the government if it decides to step in to pursue the action or by dismissing
the action while it remains under seal . . . .” Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)).
For a discussion of recent overreaching lawsuits brought by professional relators,
see supra notes 126–134 and accompanying text.
149. See Beck, supra note 29, at 608–09 (detailing the conflicts of interests
inherent in qui tam litigation).
150. Id. at 608.  Beck explained that
[t]his conflict of interest in the law enforcement process causes informers
to initiate, conduct, and terminate enforcement actions in ways that are
harmful to the broader community.  A public prosecutor, by contrast,
lacks a direct financial interest in the outcome of a case and is, therefore,
more likely to take into consideration and to act upon a broader range of
public interests than a qui tam informer.
Id. at 608–09.
151. See Reply Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Motion to Dis-
miss Relator’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 128, at 3 (explaining the
investment goals of professional relator, NHCA); United States’ Motion to Dismiss
Relator’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 5–6 (detailing the alleged
false pretenses used by professional relator, NHCA, to obtain information from
witnesses); see also Cox, supra note 12 (“Bad cases that result in bad case law inhibit
our ability to enforce the False Claims Act in good and meritorious cases.  And
from a resource perspective, when the Department’s resources are consumed for
other things, we have less time to fulfill our priorities.”).
152. See, e.g., United States’ Motion to Dismiss Relator’s Second Amended
Complaint, supra note 18, at 16 (insisting that “[t]hese relators should not be per-
mitted to indiscriminately advance claims on behalf of the government against an
entire industry that would undermine common industry practices the federal gov-
ernment has determined are, in this particular case, appropriate and beneficial to
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V. THE GAME ISN’T OVER TILL THE FINAL WHISTLE BLOWS: THE IMPACT
OF NOT ALLOWING DOJ DISMISSALS TO BE SWIFT
Allowing relators to proceed over the DOJ’s objection has severe con-
sequences for the government, the courts, and defendants.153  In particu-
lar, if professional relators backed by Wall Street investors can challenge
every DOJ decision to dismiss, the burden of thoroughly investigating each
case, preparing a detailed cost/benefit analysis, and convincing a judge
that the dismissal decision is rationally related to a valid government pur-
pose may discourage the DOJ from exercising its dismissal authority in
non-meritorious cases that are not in the public interest.154  This in turn
could lead to financially ruinous results for defendants.155
Further, broad public policy concerns arise if professional relators are
permitted to proceed alone in targeting healthcare providers and other
defendants to extract huge settlements under threat of enormous FCA lia-
bility.156  For example, access to healthcare and medically necessary drugs
could be curtailed if providers are financially ruined by the costs associ-
ated with defending and settling non-meritorious FCA lawsuits.157  With
federal healthcare programs and their beneficiaries”).
153. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant, supra note 139, at 5 (“Meritless FCA cases exact enormous
public costs.  And letting meritless or inappropriate cases go forward burdens de-
fendants, the courts, and the government itself.”); see also Dayna Bowen Matthew,
The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Pharma-
ceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 331 (2007) (“[Q]ui tam-directed litiga-
tion hinders the development of good law, and costs companies, individuals, and
taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars.”).
154. See Cedarbaum, supra note 104 (predicting that, even if most judges rule
in favor of the government when applying the rational relation test, “if they do so
only after demanding a substantial evidentiary showing, the burden of making that
showing itself may discourage the government from exercising its dismissal author-
ity”); see also Opening Brief for the U.S., supra note 122, at 36 (arguing that “in a
case where a stated ground for dismissal is the desire to prevent inefficient use of
government resources, it would be perverse to require the government to conduct
an investigation more extensive than it deems appropriate before exercising its
dismissal authority”).
155. See Jesse D.H. Snyder, Staying True to the False Claims Act: Why the Govern-
ment Is an Unexplored Prime Vehicle to Dismiss Cases, 48 U. MEM. L. REV. 257, 279
(2017) (citing United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus., 166 F. Supp. 3d 737,
764 (E.D. Tex. 2015)) (“When confronted with a relator brandishing a lawsuit
alleging violations under the FCA, the scope of liability can be ruinous.”).  In Trin-
ity Indus., the court ordered the defendants to pay $464,352,525.00 to the govern-
ment and $218,021,090.75 to the relator. Trinity Indus., 166 F. Supp. 3d at 764.
156. See U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, supra note 7, at 2 (explain-
ing that “certain aspects of FCA . . . incentivize the filing of frivolous lawsuits and
impose irrationally excessive penalties, sometimes for technical violations that oc-
cur despite businesses’ good faith efforts to comply with contracts or regulations.
These aspects of the FCA practice generate unnecessary litigation costs for govern-
ment and businesses and coerce businesses that may have done nothing wrong to
pay enormous out-of-court settlements based on untested and questionable legal
theories.”).
157. See id. (pointing out that the costs of defending and settling FCA lawsuits
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the increase in the number of qui tam cases filed, particularly those by
professional relators, the importance of the DOJ being able to use its sec-
tion 3730(c)(2)(A) authority and dismiss cases not in the public interest is
greatly amplified.158  In order to avoid violating the Take Care Clause of
the Constitution, to uphold the prosecutorial discretion afforded to the
Executive Branch, and to prevent self-interested professional relators from
proceeding with cases that are not in the public interest, the Swift unfet-
tered right approach should be the uniform standard for courts to use
when reviewing DOJ motions to dismiss.159
can be enormous, even when businesses may have done nothing wrong); Brief of
the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant,
supra note 139, at 26 (“It is not surprising . . . that ‘[p]harmaceutical, medical
devices, and health care companies’ alone ‘spend billions each year’ dealing with
FCA litigation.” (quoting Bentivoglio et al., False Claims Act Investigations: Time for a
New Approach?, 3 FIN. FRAUD L. REP. 801, 801 (2011))).
158. See Eric Alexander, Putting the False in False Claims Act Cases, DRUG & DE-
VICE L. BLOG (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2016/11/
putting-the-false-in-false-claims-act-cases.html [https://perma.cc/D52C-AHU2]
(discussing the drastic consequences that can result when unscrupulous relators
exploit the flaws in the qui tam bounty system, noting that the FCA “creates ex-
traordinary financial incentives for relators and counsel alike to burden defend-
ants’ and courts’ resources with meritless FCA claims.  Due to the risk of enormous
litigation exposure and the burdens of litigating complex cases of alleged fraud,
numerous defendants have settled FCA cases because they could not justify the
potential costs to litigate the case and roll the dice at trial.  Thus, a relator or
relator’s counsel has an enormous incentive to obtain sufficient information to
survive a motion to dismiss an FCA complaint, which they may well be able to
leverage into a settlement.” (citations omitted)).
159. For a discussion of how the Swift approach supports the constitutionality
of the FCA by recognizing the government’s prosecutorial discretion, see supra
Section IV.A.  For a discussion of recent cases filed by bounty-hunting professional
relators that the government deemed to be not in the public interest, see supra
notes 126–134 and accompanying text.
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